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between being and goodness deserves to be his most celebrated doctrine concerning esse.
My misgivings about this little book are far outweighed by my admiration of
it. It is what I will recommend to any non-specialist colleague or student who
wants a good, brief, philosophical introduction to Aquinas.

The Effectiveness of Causes, by Dorothy Emmett. Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1985. pp. x + 136. Cloth $34.50; paper $14.95.

Reviewed by RICHARD E. CREEL, Ithaca College.
Emmett's Causes is an important contribution to analytic and speculative
metaphysics, and though most of her references are to analytic philosophers,
she discusses several idealist philosophers and acknowledges a large debt to the
middle works of A.N. Whitehead.
The first thrust of Causes is to show that the Humean analysis of causation,
i.e., 'event-causation,' is unsatisfactory. According to event-causation the basic
constituents of reality are events that occur and perish instantaneously. Consequently, the appearance of change in an enduring object and of efficient causation between objects are illusions.
Emmett argues that memory makes it impossible for us to believe this interpretation of causation. "On the model of causation as a sequence of events, a present
state succeeds a past state, and that is all there is to be said. But memory suggests
there is a great deal more to be said. What has happened in the past has had
real effects in making us what we are ... " [93]. "We cannot doubt that our
present life is shaped by past experiences" [91]. "Our primitive experience is of
the derivation of what is going on in the present from what was going on in the
immediate past" [88].
The way out of the Zeno-universe of event-causation is to start with the position
that the basic constituents of reality are things, not events. Events are secondary
to things, occurring because the actions of things upon one another cause transactions, impacts, operations that result in change of one sort or another, including
the persistence of an object from one moment to the next.
A cause is "something on which something happening to something else
depends" [87]. Emmett distinguishes two types of cause. In transeunt causation
there is "a product apart from the activity of producing," as when one thing acts
upon another. In immanent causation "the product is not separable from the
activity producing it," as in a dance or a recollection. Transeunt causation depends
upon immanent causation because the transeunt impact of one individual on
another presupposes the persistence of each while the causal transaction takes
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place and the effects are carried forward.
A person is an organism that, like all organisms, is a functioning system
characterized by a pattern of development, maturation, senescence, and death.
These changes are generated by immanent causation. Hence, mind and body are
not different substances acting upon one another; they are "a unity with different
levels of functioning which affect each other" [105].
In her final chapter Emmett asks in what sense God could be the cause of
anything. God cannot be a transeunt cause because God cannot be external to
anything in the appropriate sense, and nothing can be independent of God in the
appropriate sense. However, God can be related to the world as immanent cause,
and Emmett confesses herself to be forced by the existence of creativity to believe
that there is "a basic kind of immanent causation in organisms as active systems"
[108] .
Emmett uses the mind-body relation to explicate the relation of God to each
person. As the mind expresses itself through the body, grace expresses itself
through the mind-forming and transforming it, sustaining, renewing, inspiring
it. That we have such experiences of renewal, etc., cannot be doubted; nor can
it be doubted that they feel as though they well up from within us from beyond
us. Moreover, "If [this] transforming power comes up through deep energies of
the psyche, from a root where mental and physiological are hardly distinguished,
it may indeed be the working in human life of a creative power which is also
efficacious at other levels of nature in whatever forms are open to them" [119].
This does not mean that the universe should be thought of as a single organism.
It should be thought of as a nexus of individuals dynamically cross-related but
not coordinated in an external way, as, say, the parts of a loom are coordinated
by a machinist, or the interplay of the ponies, dogs, and parakeets of an animal
act are coordinated by their trainer. The only teleology effected by grace is
effected from within each individual. The notion of divine teleology imposed
from without must be cast out along with that of divine transeunt causation.
Now I would like to raise four questions. First, on 115 Emmett rejects flatly
the notion that God can be thought of as a person over against other persons.
Does this mean that for her "God" is only a functional term that refers to whatever
it is that forms and transforms us, renews and inspires us, a La John Dewey or
H.N. Wieman?
Second, Emmett rejects classical dualism, holding that mind and body are
substantially continuous with one another, and she insists that grace operates on
us only immanently, as the mind operates upon the body. Does that not suggest
that as mind-body is one substance, so grace-mind-body is one substance? So
why does she not embrace some form of pantheism [115]?
Third, Emmett proposes that as the mind acts upon the body, so grace acts
upon the mind. This seems to imply determinism because the body is ordinarily
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thought to be under the control of the mind when one is acting; by analogy it
would follow that the mind is under the control of grace when it is at work. Yet
it seems clear that Emmett is a libertarian. Hence, she needs to explain why the
parallelism that she claims regarding mind-body causation and grace-mind causation does not imply determinism--{)r in what respects it does and in what
respects it does not.
Finally, Emmett says nothing about the problem of evil; consequently her
notion of efficacious grace seems somewhat sentimentalistic. She speaks of
efficacious grace as "a deep creative power which, instead of feeding a ruthless
will to live, can feed a will to love, purifying the self-centeredness of the
will ... " [118-9]. If this power is, as Emmett implies, the same one that is
immanently at the base of the existence and persistence of all things, then either
it must also account for physical afflictions, mental afflictions, urges to violence,
etc., or there must be two powers at the base of all things--{)ne beneficent, one
demonic. Perhaps there is a better solution, but Emmett cannot on the one hand
paint a picture of "a deep creative power" that encourages our will to love, and
on the other hand imply that it is the same power that is immanently at the base
of all things, without creating in her readers a sense of dissonance that cries out
for resolution.
Emmett might reply that some of my questions are unfair, as she undertook
to write only a monograph. Fair enough. Indeed, I add that she covers very well
an astonishing amount of material in the space of so brief a book-including
wonderfully handled issues that I have not yet mentioned, e.g., "total cause,"
"cause as selective factor," "linear and multiple causation," "action," and "persistence as the simplest form of change." We are very fortunate to have these
fruits of her research and reflections. I hope we will be further enriched by her
answers to the questions above.

